In the peace process initiated by U.S. President Donald Trump two core issues are in the focus. These are territorial consessions and the border between sovereign Ukraine and the occupied territories, as well as the security guarantees to be provided to Ukraine once the war with Russia is over.
Despite Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said that 26 countries are ready to guarantee Ukraine’s security, including European countries, the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and many others, the frameworks for these security guarantees remain highly undefined.
It seems that, despite the common understanding among many countries that security guarantees for Ukraine are essential, the conceptual work enabling their provision has not yet been completed.
The issue of security guarantees divides EU Member States, given that some of them that are also part of the Coalition of the Willing would consider the EU itself to be the main guarantor of security for Ukraine, while others do not prefer to link the issue of security guarantees to Ukraine’s EU membership.
Some believe that, with regard to the issue of security guarantees which might meet Ukraine’s demands, NATO membership is the very first thing to consider. However, it also needs to be pointed out that NATO membership is not realistic for Ukraine any time soon. At the same time, it is also clear that bilateral security guarantees cannot provide the same level of security as NATO can. Considering this, focus has shifted to a hybrid solution which can be called the State of Israel equivalent security guarantee. In addition to the Israel-style security architecture, there are some more ideas for Ukraine’s security system in the future, including the so-called ’Finlandization’ and the South Korean model.
An Israel model
In April 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy argued that post-war Ukraine could resemble a ’big Israel’ in Europe regarding its security policy.
In an interview with an Italian newspaper, President Volodymyr Zelensky said security guarantees following the example of Israel, where the country receives comprehensive financial, political, and military support from the U.S. and its allies, are ’good proposals on the way to NATO that should be ’explored in detail.’
Despite the fact that time has showed that Ukraine cannot view itself as a European Israel, the Israel model has gained support in Washington and among NATO members. This model indeed seems more viable than NATO membership: a relationship modeled on the US-Israel relationship that focuses on weapons supplies and military assistance could be useful for Ukraine to deter future Russian attacks.
There are three main defining features of this model:
- Israel is not a formal treaty ally but a ’quasi ally’ of the U.S.
- Regardless the lack of a formal treaty commitment, the U.S. provided written security guarantees to Israel (1975, 1981).
- Steadfast support, gestures and high-cost military assistance are provided to Israel to suggest that the U.S. commitment is no bluff at all which should be clear also for the enemies of Israel.
When mentioning the pros and cons of building a possible Israel-type model for Ukraine, the most obvious benefit is that it would be one of the most efficient ways to strengthen Ukrainian deterrence and enable that country to defend itself. In addition, an Israeli-style partnership would also be beneficial for Washington to increase its influence. At the same time, the Israel model cannot provide solutions to basic issues of conflict management, nor does it prevent future conflicts, the American The Red Cell Project says. Another aspect, namely that an Israel-style commitment to Ukraine might be no less threatening to Russia than a path toward NATO membership for Ukraine should also be mentioned, according to the same U.S. think-tank.
’If policymakers elect to pursue an Israel model with Ukraine, they should start small and focus on clearly defined aims – such as bolstering Ukrainian defensive capabilities – rather than broader questions, such as alliance interoperability’, The Red Cell Project’s analysis concludes.
A South Korean model
South Korea’s postwar economic trajectory and powerful air defenses could serve as an example for Ukraine if the United States backs Kyiv as it did Seoul, Zelenskyy recently suggested to a French newspaper. He said that South Korea’s economic boom in the 20th century shows that ’values have triumphed and could be a good example for Ukraine’. South Korea has many air defense systems that guarantee their security, Zelenskyy pointed out, adding that Ukraine aimed to acquire solid security guarantees, for example, Patriot systems, which South Korea has.
After the Korean War, which left the peninsula in ruins and carved it in two, South Korea – backed by the United States and its allies – stepped on a path of rapid reconstruction and industrialization, POLITICO has recently pointed out. This is the combination both Kyiv and the West are open for with regard to Ukraine.
At this point, it is important to note that about 28,000 American troops are also stationed in South Korea to help deter aggression from North. In case of Ukraine, the U.S., in particular President Trump has rejected sending troops to the country, insisting Europe would have to frontload a future peacekeeping force. Second, the scale of the threats in case of South Korea and Ukraine cannot be compared, which Zelenskyy himself admits. Given this, a simple replication of the South Korean model would probably not be suitable for Ukraine in terms of security.
’Finlandization’
As part of the peace talks initiatives, the idea of Ukraine’s possible ’Finlandization’ has surfaced. In this case, ’Finlandization’ refers to Finland’s Cold War status, its position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.
In a nutshell: After 1940, the Soviet Union annexed about 9 percent of Finland’s territory. After the war, Finland also had to comply with political conditions dictated by Moscow, a process referred to as ’Finlandization.’ Still, the country preserved its independence and Western orientation. For more than four decades, ’Finlandization’ served as a survival strategy for Finnish independence. The Cold War ended, and Finland became an EU member state in 1995. In 2023, the country joined NATO.
According to many experts, in 2025, the question for Ukraine is either Finlandization or mobilization while some analysts and politicians warn that forcing neutrality on Ukraine will not bring about a peaceful solution to the crisis with Russia. The fact that in September 2025, Finnish President Alexander Stubb has argued that Ukraine can repeat Finland’s success should also be mentioned.
As for this scenario, many believe that in 1945, Finland had no choice but to undergo long decades of ’Finlandization’ while Ukraine has other options adding that these solutions may be unacceptable to Moscow. As a con, many security experts believe that Ukrainian neutrality will not stop Putin’s Russia. Considering all opinions, a modernized Winter War scenario is possible, Estonian MP and Chairman of the National Defence Committee Kalev Stoicescu considers in his article about Ukraine’s future.
A security model for Ukraine which is acceptable for both the West and Ukraine and also for Russia is yet to come…
When asked about a Korean model, Zelenskyy said to journalists: ’You ask me if this scenario could happen in Ukraine? My answer is that anything is possible’. He responded similarly to questions regarding Israel-style security guarantees, indicating that there are indeed no clear plans in this context yet.
When it comes to providing security guarantees for Ukraine, the main question is whether the integration of Ukraine into Western security structures is a good idea. Some say yes, because it would project strength to Russia, which is the only language Vladimir Putin understands while others believe that a Ukraine in the Western world can easily result in World War 3.
As a starting point, allowing Ukrainians to define their own future would be essential. But taking into consideration the security of Europe, it is mainly the European countries that need to decide which way Ukraine should go. At the same time, they should, of course, assist Ukraine to create a security environment that will help Ukraine to protect itself in the future.
As a result of tensions between the United States and Europe, the West is lagging behind in figuring out what kind of security framework it can and is ready to offer to post-war Ukraine. On the one hand, this is a mistake because it portrays the West as weak and divided. On the other hand, it is the Ukrainians still fighting on the frontlines who are paying the highest price for the West’s hesitation.
