In the complex chessboard of geopolitics, Georgia has long been a crucial piece, strategically situated between Russia and the West.
Over the past decade, the country has walked on a tightrope, balancing its aspirations for European integration with the harsh realities of its geographic proximity to Russia.
For many in Tbilisi, the lesson from the war in Ukraine is clear: while Western support is invaluable (theoretically, at least), it does not come with guarantees against aggression.
Since 2022, this has led to a more cautious approach by the Georgian government, seeking to avoid provoking Moscow and risking a repeat of the Ukrainian scenario.
However, recent shifts in Georgia’s policy, driven by a desire to avoid war and protect national interests, have cast its government in a negative light in Western eyes. Once a favoured partner, the ruling Georgian Dream Party became somewhat of a “problem child”, facing criticism from the very allies who once celebrated its governance before the elections in October.
It is not difficult to see that in the heart of Georgia’s recent geopolitical recalibration is a stark and sobering priority: avoiding war with Russia.
No, the Georgian society not become Russian-friendly, neither have their politicians lost their minds, they just fear to become the next Ukraine. Fears not completely unfounded.
The Georgian government, led by Georgian Dream since 2012, has witnessed the devastating consequences of Western-leaning policies in Ukraine. The conflict there, which escalated into a full-scale war following Russia’s invasion in 2022, has served as a cautionary tale for Tbilisi.
And it looks like they learned.
While Georgia shares Ukraine’s desire for closer ties with the European Union and NATO, the costs of provoking Moscow have become all too clear, along with the limits of Western security guarantees.
For Georgia, the national interest lies in maintaining peace and stability, even if that means slowing down its march towards Western integration, especially as it doesn’t seem to be set in stone (based on another learning curve: the Balkans. And Turkey).
Thus, the government’s approach has been one of cautious pragmatism, seeking to avoid the kind of confrontation that could lead to a devastating conflict on Georgian soil.
This strategic retreat is not an abandonment of Western ideals but a calculated effort to protect the country from the existential threat posed by Russia. That is why the Georgian government chose symbolic affairs to make the move away from the West unmistakable, provoking the anger of many Georgians, along with capitals around the continent.
The Georgian Dream party, which rose to power in 2012, was initially welcomed by the West as a stabilizing force after years of political turmoil under the previous government. The party’s early years were marked by efforts to balance Georgia’s foreign policy, pursuing closer ties with the EU and NATO while also managing a complex relationship with Russia. This balanced approach earned the government praise from Western capitals, where it was seen as a responsible and pragmatic partner.
However, the outbreak of war in Ukraine and the subsequent intensification of East-West tensions have shifted this perception. As Georgia has adopted a more cautious stance, prioritizing national security over Western promises, the West’s view of the Georgian Dream government has soured. What was once seen as prudence is now viewed as appeasement, and the government has been increasingly criticized for not aligning more closely with Western policies.
As Georgia approaches its parliamentary elections in October 2024, the rift between the Georgian government and the West has become more pronounced.
The U.S. and EU have not shied away from taking a clear stance against the Georgian Dream party, signalling their discontent with its current policies. This criticism has gone beyond mere diplomatic rebukes, with Western officials and media outlets openly questioning the government’s commitment to democratic principles and European integration.
This shift in tone from the West has significant implications for the upcoming elections, where the Georgian Dream government will be defending its record against opposition parties that are more openly pro-Western. The growing tension between Tbilisi and its Western partners has raised concerns about the potential impact on the election, with some fearing that external pressure could exacerbate internal divisions and undermine the democratic process.
“‘Either you start the war, or you leave [power]’: This is an unacceptable proposition.” – said Bidzina Ivanishvili, Georgian politician, ex-prime minister in an interview to the Radio Free Europe. Some forces “decided to bring back to power the union of people without the motherland, the collective United National Movement,” Ivanishvili said, using the party’s favored epithet for the opposition.
Despite these tensions, it is crucial to understand that Georgia is not a Russia-friendly country.
Whoever believes the opposite should remember (or check) the mass protests in Tbilisi in 2022 February and March, demanding Western intervention.
Georgian society and government harbour deep-seated fears of Russia, rooted in a history of conflict and occupation. The scars of the 2008 war, in which Russia occupied the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, remain fresh in the national consciousness. The decision to adopt a more cautious foreign policy is not a reflection of any affinity for Moscow, but rather a realistic assessment of the threats that Georgia faces.
The Georgian government’s strategy is driven by a desire to protect its people from the horrors of war, not by any ideological alignment with Russia. The notion that Georgia is shifting toward Russia is a misinterpretation of the government’s “balancing act”, seemed as pushing away the West, while in reality, Tbilisi has not become the enemy of the EU or the USA.
It only acts with the understanding that provoking Moscow could have catastrophic consequences.
The perception that the West has “lost” Georgia is also a result of strategic missteps and inconsistent engagement by both the EU and the United States. While the West has expressed support for Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations, the actual support has often been more symbolic than substantive. Promises of NATO membership and EU integration have remained elusive, leading to a sense of betrayal among some in Georgia.
Moreover, the West has struggled to effectively counter Russian influence in Georgia. Efforts to support civil society and democratic institutions have often been insufficient in the face of Russia’s pervasive impact through media and economic leverage. The U.S., once a strong advocate for Georgia’s Western integration, has shifted its focus to other global priorities, other regions.
Georgia’s geopolitical strategy reflects the difficult position it occupies. The government’s decision to prioritize national security and avoid war, even at the cost of slowing down EU and NATO integration, is rooted in a deep-seated fear of Russian aggression.
Western leaders could maybe exercise some self-evaluation and assess how realistic those dreams of integration are, especially in the near future.
As the October 2024 elections approach, the stakes are high.
The West’s clear stance against the current government could influence the outcome, potentially destabilizing the delicate balance that Georgia has worked so hard to maintain.
For Tbilisi, the challenge is to navigate these turbulent waters without compromising its sovereignty or plunging the country into conflict.
The path ahead is fraught with peril, but for Georgia, the priority remains clear: avoid war, protect the nation, and find a way to reconcile these goals with the aspirations of its people for a European future.
Maybe this would be the moment to give some time to Georgia to choose its own path. Avoiding (a new) conflict might actually turn out to be beneficial also for the West.
