The Trump-Zelensky meeting prompted a series of unseen events.
Among them the European Union trying on the cloak of a global security leader, aiming at filling the formidable boots the U.S. seems eager to abandon.
For example, in Ukraine.
Spearheaded by high-profile figures like EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Kaja Kallas, the endeavour looks like a project doomed to fail right from the start, reeking of delusion.
When Kallas, merely days after an unsuccessful visit to Washington (U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio cancelled the meeting), stated that “today, it became clear that the free world needs a new leader”, she was right.
What she’s mistaken in is the conclusion: that the EU could be that new leader.
Maybe it should, but in its current state it could not.
Maybe, if the European leadership hadn’t behaved the way it did for the last couple of years.
Because right now, the EU’s aspirations to match U.S. military prowess are akin to a child trying on her mom’s stilettos: clumsy, impractical, and destined for ridicule.
Kaja Kallas, formerly Estonia’s Prime Minister and now the EU’s foreign policy chief, has been vocal about Europe’s need to bolster defense spending for a while, arguing that “every euro spent on school, healthcare and welfare [is] vulnerable”, unless the continent maintains robust defenses.
On a fun side note, while Kallas has been eagerly fighting against Russia, her husband earned nice money with businesses with said country, even after the invasion against Ukraine.
While her concern is commendable, the execution is laughable.
The EU’s defense budget, though significant, pales in comparison to that of the U.S. and Russia. The notion that Europe can single-handedly match the military might of these nations is a fantasy reserved for bedtime stories.
The EU’s answer to rapid deployment is the EU Battlegroup: a force of 1,500 to 2,000 troops, perpetually on standby.
The bright new plan is to “substantially modify” these groups into a 5,000-strong EU Rapid Deployment Capacity by 2025 (that means this year). A slight exaggeration, maybe, but with such a force, the EU might manage to secure a medium-sized shopping mall, but it could certainly not save the Ukrainian borders, let alone deter a full-scale invasion.
The idea that these battlegroups could serve as a credible deterrent is laughable, the more so given the frequent logistical difficulties. Just a reminder: Zelensky stated in Davos that “at least 200,000 European peacekeepers” would be required to defend Ukraine against possible Russian aggression.
Of course, this is only an EU-level force that has never been fully operational, nor was it a high priority item on Brussels’ to do list.
Would one add some (or most) of the main European countries’ forces, the picture would look different.
Yet, it would still be minuscule compared to American or Russian capabilities.
Not to mention the slight problem that there are several defense areas where European capabilities clearly don’t exist.
As examples, one could start with air defense systems. Here, France’s SAMP/T system is a potential alternative to Patriots, but it is available in very small numbers and has shorter range.
It wasn’t a coincidence that European countries didn’t scramble to supply Ukraine with fighter jets, either. European ability to supply spare parts and weapons is limited, so are production capabilitiess. And even if Europe delivers F-16s, it is only the US that produces enough air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, meaning Ukraine’s air force would be ineffective without continued American munitions.
The Heavy Artillery and Ammunition Production in Europe is still not enough to cover Ukrainian requests, the US has supplied HIMARS rocket launchers and GPS-guided rockets (GMLRS), which have been vital in targeting Russian logistics. No European country produces HIMARS or GMLRS, and while France is developing LRP (Long-Range Precision fires), it is years away from being operational.
We could mention the lack of tanks, armored vehicles, logistic, maintenance, but the most important missing European capabilities are on fields of Satellite Intelligence and Reconnaissance, Space-Based Communications, Electronic Warfare and Cyber Capabilities.
The U.S. leverages its unparalleled satellite networks to provide real-time, high-resolution imagery of Russian troop movements, artillery positions, and logistics hubs.
It is the U.S. that ensures secure battlefield communications for Ukraine via military-grade satellite networks (while the EU relies on vulnerable commercial satellites), enabling the Ukrainian forces to deliver precision strikes.
The US has supplied Ukraine with advanced electronic warfare systems to jam Russian communications, radar, and GPS signals.
Europe does not have the same scale of EW equipment available, leaving Ukrainian forces in dark and more vulnerable to Russian drone and missile attacks.
The list could go on.
This is the hard reality on the ground. Everything else is just delusional daydreaming. And it will remain so for many years, even if the EU (well, its members) miraculously multiplies its defense R&D budget.
Think the European Sky Shield Initiative.
In a bid to protect the continent from aerial threats, the EU has the project that could serve as a study case of failed European defense ideas.
This project aims to create a ground-based integrated European air defense system, including anti-ballistic missile capabilities. As of 2025, 23 European states are involved.
However, the initiative is riddled with holes—much like Swiss cheese. The lack of a unified command structure, differing national interests, and budget constraints make this defense system more of a pipe dream than a feasible plan.
Cyber defense is another area where the EU’s ambitions crash against the rocks of reality.
While the EU has established agencies like ENISA (European Union Agency for Cybersecurity), member states’ cyber capabilities vary widely.
Besides, these sporadic capabilities are paired with significant gaps elsewhere.
A fresh 2025 analysis suggests that Europe would need additional 300,000 troops and an annual defense spending increase of at least €250 billion in the short term to deter Russian aggression. Despite a record €270 billion defense spending in 2023, Europe still lacks essential assets like ammunition supplies and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.
And this is only the beginning.
Bloomberg estimates that European NATO members should spend an additional $3.1 trillion over the next decade to bolster their defense capabilities against potential Russian aggression and to support Ukraine.
The EU’s procurement processes are fragmented, leading to inefficiencies and duplication of efforts. Between June 2022 and June 2023, 78 percents of EU military equipment acquisitions were sourced abroad, with 63 percent from the United States, highlighting Europe’s reliance on external suppliers.
Maybe it would be high time for Ms. Kallas to wake up.
There were only two European leaders who stood out for their pragmatic approach after the Trump-Zelensky fiasco.
Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer.
Meloni, with her no-nonsense attitude, had been focusing on strengthening Italy’s military capabilities and acknowledged the necessity to stabilize the Transatlantic relations. She called for a U.S – EU summit to get a clearer picture.
British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, on the other hand, has been a vocal supporter of Ukraine, advocating for increased defense spending and a robust stance against Russian aggression.
In the course of a few days, Starmer became the most important player – or the Coach of the Transatlantic Team – between the U.S, Europe and Ukraine. One, who tries to create stability and normality in this debate.
Both leaders understand that relying solely on EU mechanisms for defense is a recipe for disaster. Starmer also highlighted the importance of bridging tensions and proposed working on peace plans with Ukraine to present to the U.S..
The EU’s current trajectory is not just misguided; it’s dangerous.
By fostering the illusion that Europe can replace the U.S. in global security, EU leaders are setting the stage for catastrophic failure.
This false hope diverts attention and resources from the real work of building credible defense capabilities. It’s akin to a group of friends planning a cross-country road trip in a car held together by duct tape and hope, ignoring the fact that they lack the fuel, the map, and the driving skills.
In the end, the EU’s attempt to usurp the U.S.’s role in global security is a fantasy of the highest order.
The resources, coordination, and capabilities required are simply beyond Europe’s reach.
Meloni’s and Starmer’s focus on strengthening national defense and working within established alliances like NATO offer a more realistic path forward. Until EU leaders wake up from their delusional daydreams, the continent will remain vulnerable, and the Ukrainian conflict will continue to be a painful reminder of the perils of wishful thinking.
