Being the President of France is not for the faint hearted, probably not even in calmer and more predictable times.
The headlines from President Macron’s last couple of years often featured titles like “Macron walks tightrope” or “Macron attempts diplomatic balancing act” – a reminder that during the last decade France navigated itself into a position when it literally must find a common ground between two irreconcilable forces.
Once the superstar poster child of French politics, Macron often tries to portrait himself as a strong leader with worldwide influence, also showcasing his diplomatic flexibility.
Alas, that sphere of influence (and political clout) is shrinking at an incredible speed, giving the French president many opportunities to prove his flexible approach – though with less and less success.
There is a lot at stake on the economic field, to start with, as much at home as abroad. His government faces attacks from the outside (from the far-right National Assembly, with or without Marine le Pen) and disagreements in the inside with Prime Minister Barnier.
Then, there is the problem of France’s diminishing (or mostly disappeared) influence in the Sahel region and beyond. At the same time when Russia and China have increasingly asserted their presence, particularly through military, economic, and diplomatic means, France long the dominant European power in the Sahel, has seen its influence erode.
The junta in Mali has just disposed of the government. As the rift within the ruling echelons of Mali widens, there is no sign neither of peace, nor any intention to return to France’s side. If anything, the ousting of the government raises further uncertainty about the running of the country’s transition and future.
France’s retreat has been driven by a combination of factors, including growing local hostility toward French military presence, the failure of counterterrorism operations, and the increasing reluctance of local governments to allow foreign forces to operate within their borders. (In fact, Mali expelled the French in 2022.)
Thus, by mid-November 2024, France had fully withdrawn from Mali and Burkina Faso, and its presence elsewhere in the wider Sahel region has been reduced, too, along with its leverage to influence domestic issues. And Russia has moved to fill the void, most notably through the activities of the Wagner Group, which has gained a foothold in countries like Mali and Burkina Faso.
Mr. Macron has problems on the other side of the globe, too, as his recent encounter with Argentina’s Javier Milei proved it. The silence on the press meeting that followed their face-to-face was probably more telling than thousand words.
It’s not just about the fate of the 2015 Paris climate accord, but just as much the EU-Mercosur trade agreement that would hurt Paris’s and French farmers’ interests. Macron’s South American tour before the G20 summit in Brazil was a last minute attempt of charm offensive to try to convince Latin America of the necessity in staying in the first while ditching (or at least watering down) the second. For the sake of the climate, of course – and not the protesting farmers, voting in flocks for the far-right.
More importantly, it is about France’s diminishing influence in South America, and elsewhere in the world.
Though Buenos Aires hasn’t left the Paris Agreement (yet), the withdrawal of its representatives from the COP29 summit in Baku has left many wondering how long it will remain there.
While it was not a big surprise that Macron tried but failed to persuade Trump to stay in the Paris accord in 2017, he hoped to have more leverage over other countries on the other side of the Atlantic. (Maybe in the form of a few French submarines delivered at discounted prices.)
But based on the silence between the two leaders (spiced up with Macron’s visit to victims
Just like he clashed (and failed) with former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro over rampant deforestation in the Amazon a couple of years ago.
Experts fear that Argentina would only be the first and Buenos Aires’ withdrawal would trigger a domino effect across the region.
But probably the most ironic of all is Macron’s China trouble.
If the EU’s own issues, like its slow growth, wouldn’t have a significant negative effect on France, the intensifying trade war with China threatens France with losing an important market for its famed cognac (and other alcoholic beverages).
President Macron’s meeting with his Chinese counterpart on the sidelines of the G20 proves that he takes the issue seriously, but the mutual desire to “seek a favourable outcome” might lead to nowhere instead of the desired breakthrough.
Again, the reality is that France must probably decide which of its own hands to bite: the one that produces cognacs or the one that tries to compete with Chinese EVs. Not to mention President Macron’s repeated call for “more strategic immunity” for Europe, that would require less dependence on anybody else, including China and its rare earth minerals and other resources.
Prime Minister Michel Barnier might be a great negotiator, but this might turn out to be a tough fight even for him. (But Macron might hope that the task would keep him busy just enough so he stops undermining the president’s economic policy. Or at least he would bear the responsibility for the failure.)
To add insult to the injury, though Macron himself urged Russia to “listen to reason” amidst the escalating situation in Ukraine, he had to literally beg Chinese President Xi Jinping to “use all his influence” with Putin to try to achieve a de-escalation, because he had “the capacity to negotiate with President Putin so that he halts his attacks”.
