While the need for Europe to be able to defend itself with or without the United States in the event of an armed conflict is certainly reasonable and justified, European Union Member States disagree regarding the way how the continent could ultimately get to such a merciful state. With the end of the Cold War, from the 1990s onwards, European countries have significantly cut their defence spending and this has not changed until recent years.
The ReArm Europe initiative, announced by the President of the European Commission on 4 March, proposes €800 billion to strengthen the European Union’s defence capabilities but so far there are more questions than answers about the programme and its feasibility, such as how Member States in very different security and financial situations can agree that they should each find the money for defence spending by themselves, not to mention the fact that only a very small number of them actually have a significant defence industry of their own.
Scepticism concerning the future success of the project, however, is not rooted in the different national realities, but rather comes from history, what makes us cautious about rejoicing over the idea of a joint European armament. One should not have in mind here in the first place the two world wars that left the Old Continent in turmoil with decades of trauma, given that, despite all contrary indications including some ill-considered statements by certain top EU officials and national leaders, it is safe to assume that none of the EU Member States wants a World War III.
Therefore, rather than going back to the world wars in history, it is enough to recall already existing European treaties and initiatives such as the Maastricht Treaty, the European Security and Defence Policy, the European Defence Fund, the EU Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) etc., as all of them offer some ideas for constructing and sustaining a common European defence. Interestingly, in terms of common defence, the mentioned initiatives ultimately proved to be empty documents, as nothing of a common EU defence has been achieved so far.
In the context of the Russo-Ukrainian war, the European Union’s ambition for common defence would be fully acceptable, if collective measures were to be taken to increase effectiveness, and not just because the Commission has decided to make it compulsory for all Member States, without any regard for differences and, unless the Commission were to combine rearming Europe with supporting Ukraine.
Another reason for scepticism is the historic failure of Ursula von der Leyen in her former top job as Germany’s Defense Minister. It is worth pointing out that, the President of the European Commission – presenter of the ReArm Europe plan – can be held personally responsible for the chaos in the German army with pushing ideas such as a family-friendly army, and also for the downshift in the German defence industry. Her negative results have proved to be unprecedented in German history: in a report in 2019, the Bundenstag’s Defence Commissioner revealed that the German army was in the worst condition in that year since 1990… According to the report, the German Bundeswehr is ’still underequipped, understaffed and overly bureaucratic’, there is ’a rise in reports of sexual harassment and some instances of far-right extremism among soldiers’. ’The biggest problem that Bundeswehr soldiers complained about was the lack of equipment’, the report says.
The question is: what can be expected from someone who failed to strengthen and develop a national army with a long history, great traditions and a solid military force, when it comes to future success of an EU-wide army development programme? Nothing good, one might suggest.
As mentioned above, the Member States themselves will be responsible for raising the necessary funds to implement the common armaments programme. It should be stressed that there is growing scepticism among EU leaders as to whether the €800 billion announced by von der Leyen will be used effectively and properly. Against the widely known historical background, there is absolutely no guarantee of this.
We have not yet touched on the most important issue relating to the ReArm Europe plan, namely the doubts regarding the need for an additional military bloc beyond NATO. This issue seems to be key, especially because there are also doubts about NATO’s effectiveness, which NATO is trying to address by demanding an increase in defence budgets to 3% of GDP. A brilliant idea might have come to von der Leyen’s mind: something that does not work well within NATO will surely perfectly work outside NATO, all we need to do is put a lot of money in the collective bucket.
It is worth noting here that various research institutions have already calculated how much it would cost Europe to defend itself without America. For instance, in 2019, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimated that Europeans would need to invest between €257 billion and €318 billion to be able to face a possible Russian aggression in case of a US withdrawal.
Another open question that arises with the formation of a new military grouping is: how will this new military alliance, a so-called European Defence Union be different from NATO, apart from the fact that Europe can no longer rely on the support of the United States? According to the opinion of the many sceptics and those who are concerned, all this would be a mere duplicity, which, in fact would be an obvious waste of money. Moreover, since von der Leyen has dreamed big, it is not a matter of €200 billion, but of €800 billion.
Another fully justified concern about the defence programme is that its funds will quickly be directed to Member States with significant defence industries, such as Germany and France, resulting in a massive dependency between the other Member States and these two countries, further deepening the existing gap between them.
Investing in Europe’s defence is worthwhile, there is no doubt about that. However, building up European defence, designing and implementing a new European rearming requires solid plans, developed with real professional expertise and, perhaps, years of dedicated work. The Commission’s proposals should work ’very fast and very efficiently,’ a senior EU official said. The White Paper for European Defence and the ReArm Europe Plan / Readiness 2030, announced by the Commission 19 March, seems not to meet any basic requirements
In the context of the current €800 billion ReArm package, it can be stated with certainty that, as a result of double standards and unequal distribution, it will only deepen existing trenches between Member States on the one side, while on the other side corruption and inefficient use of funds will be major problems.
In addition to all this, the most problematic aspect of von der Leyen’s ReArm Europe plan is that it is designed with full disregard for country-specific geopolitical interests, which ultimately, is the best recipe for failure. In addition to concerns regarding von der Leyen’s personal skills to successfully manage such a large-scale military project, the lack of respect for Member States’ interests is the key cause for concern as far as a common European defence. All things considered, and given the circumstances and the poor planning, there can be only one real winner in this €800 billion gamble: von der Leyen herself.
