On 27 February 2022, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz gave a bold speech in the Bundestag.
It was there, standing under the magnificent glass dome that he used the term “Zeitenwende” – a compound word that could be roughly translated as “a changing of the times”.
Not the longest word in the language notorious for its penchant for ginormous compound words, jovially called “Bandwurmwörter”, or tapeworm words (think Rindfleischetikettierungsüberwachungsaufgabenübertragungsgesetz), but one with a tremendous effect despite its shortness. No wonder the Society for the German Language (GFDS) named it the word of the year for 2022.
It was meant as the beginning of a new era for Germany’s security and defense policy, a moment most of Berlin’s allies had been waiting for.
Besides calling Russian President Vladimir Putin a “warmonger” and outlining his government’s plans to counter the Russian offensive in Ukraine, Chancellor Scholz also promised increases in German budgetary allotments for defense spending.
The planned step to exceed the NATO requirement of 2 percent of GDP spent on defense spending was something his own Social Democratic Party (SPD) has opposed for decades.
The “Zeitenwende”, turning Berlin’s back to the conflict-averse past and taking bold steps into a more defense-focused future, was made necessary by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Without that, nothing would have happened, because if anything, the traffic light coalition wanted to avoid changes in the direction of Germany’s security and defense policy, having campaigned with the promise of continuing Angela Merkel’s strategy.
Within the last month, Scholz’s cabinet has declared another, well, several political U-turns.
First, in the wake of the recent deadly knife attacks across the country pushed Chancellor Scholz to vow to toughen knife laws and step-up deportations of rejected asylum seekers.
As all suspects were asylum-seekers, the events intensified the country-wide debate about immigration and brought massive criticism to the government. In his defense, Scholz rushed to clarify that there had been a 30 percent increase in deportations in 2024, but he also promised that his government would “look very closely at how we can contribute to raising these figures even further”, including restarting to deport criminals from to Afghanistan and Syria, countries previously deemed unsafe.
Then, on September 9, Berlin announced plans to extend controls to all its land borders and turn away more asylum seekers in a bid to reduce irregular migration. Another dramatic shift from the country’s previous open-door policy. The initial plan is to establish only temporary controls, for the coming six months. It was also promised that checks would be random.
Germany’s neighbors are not happy about the step.
Poland, for example, drew Berlin’s attention to the fact that external border controls would be more effective, while Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis declared that it would be wrong to “move to a logic of ad hoc exemptions from the Schengen Agreement, with border controls that will […] hurt one of the fundamental achievements of the EU”.
Unfortunately, as German immigration authorities are overburdened , it is unlikely that any significant change can happen within six months.
Scholz’s critics, for example from the conservative opposition CDU/CSU, have repeatedly pointed out, there has been a lot of talking, but “announcements alone won’t be enough”. “Action must follow”, as governor of North-Rhine-Westphalia, Hendrik Wüst has said. But the mills of German administration turn slowly. Though legislation intended to ease deportations of unsuccessful asylum-seekers was approved in January, the lack of (human) resources makes the process still painfully slow and ineffective.
As it is also unlikely that the wise men in the orbit of Scholz are unaware of the pitfalls and shortcoming of any quick-fix to migration, it is likely that the real reason for the U-turns is the rise of the “far-right” AfD.
With elections in Brandenburg just around the corner and anti-immigration AfD polling first and being poised to repeat its previous success in Thuringia and Saxony, it might seem the winning tactic to adopt policies that would normally fit into the armory of the so-called “far-right” party.
While the ability to adapt to changing circumstances is a positive characteristic, the Scholz Government looks more like lacking a clear, consistent direction. A leadership that lost its set of principles and changes its opinions and actions too easily based on external influences, for one single reason: to keep their grip on power.
It must be for the same reason that Berlin has cautiously toned down its support for Ukraine and is suspiciously quiet on Poland’s role in the attack against the Nord Stream pipelines, especially the possibility that Warsaw facilitated the escape of one of the suspected perpetrators/masterminds, a Ukrainian diving instructor.
With the AfD campaigning with an anti-war rhetoric and the pledge to end the war, German support for Ukraine is already under heavy pressure. Though Scholz intends to support Ukraine “for as long as necessary”, the commitment has noticeably changed.
Instead of a bold and ambitious government that took the brave step of “Zeitenwende”, the traffic light coalition looks more like a “Wetterfahne” (a nice, short compound word for weathervane).
