News arrived first only sparsely, more like rumours than facts for the first few hours and days, but then turned into a tide as Ukraine finally announced on August 10 that its forces have successfully invaded Russia in the Kursk Oblast.
The latest of such news being that Ukraine claimed control of hundreds of square miles of Russian territory. “A very real success”, as former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine John Herbst said. To put in perspective, Ukrainian forces managed to seize more territory during these few days than Russia managed in the Kharkiv region during months of offensive.
Russian troops abandoned their positions, while reinforcements were taken out by a Ukrainian missile attack. It is said that Ukraine managed to hack traffic cameras to be able to monitor the movement of troops and also, that Russian communications were jammed.
The Ukrainian step was followed by a large wave of evacuations, with estimates suggesting that at least 180,000 people were forced to leave their homes.
In his response, President Vladimir Putin called the act a “major provocation”, promised to “kick the enemy out” and warned the West of dire consequences: “the enemy will certainly get the response he deserves, and all our goals, without doubt, will be accomplished”.
In Kyiv’s own understanding, the attack is a “game changer” in a moment, when Russian forces are slowly, but persistently closing on some strategically important points in the east of the country. President Volodymyr Zelensky declared that “Ukraine is proving that it really knows how to restore justice and guarantees exactly the kind of pressure that is needed – pressure on the aggressor”.
The unprecedented incursion into Russian territory has been a surprise, indeed, and not only embarrassed and humiliated President Putin, who has, so far, claimed that he managed to protect the “otechestvo” [fatherland].
It exposed Russia’s planning assumptions and highlighted a few critical vulnerabilities, huge gaps in intelligence gathering and severely overstretched defence capabilities.
But, as it is unlikely that Ukraine has the capacities to hold a large piece of Russian territory, the brazen attack probably serves more as a moral booster on the home front (where people have started to show signs of fatigue) than a real intention to occupy parts of Russia. Kyiv needed a win, and it got one. Ukrainian flags are flying on Russian soil.
It might have been an attempt to force Moscow to redeploy some of its forces from Eastern Ukraine, easing the pressure there.
It might have also been intended to convince the NATO that it was still worth to continue to support Ukraine as it is still able to strike back at Russia, especially if it is given appropriate supplies.
Only time will show whether the attack was truly a “game changer”, a tactical point scored that will matter little to nothing in the big strategic picture or nothing else than a risky gamble.
The attack certainly carries some risks and forces Ukraine to sacrifice a few things.
One of such “sacrifices” might be the moral upper hand.
Up until this point, Ukraine was the victim in this “eternal fight between the good and evil” situation, and it took some serious disinformation campaign on Russia’s side to claim the contrary. Up until now, Ukrainian attacks in Russian territory were limited to critical infrastructure, runways, naval bases and oil terminals.
Now, Moscow can claim that Ukraine is no different, as its soldiers “indiscriminately strike at civilians, at civilian infrastructure, or try to create threats to nuclear power facilities”. And with pictures of burning villages and farmlands circulating on social media, it is easy to do so.
Yes, Russia obviously did the same innumerable times on Ukrainian soil during the months of the invasion. Yes, July was the deadliest month for civilian casualties since October 2022, according to the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine. But “hand for hand, eye for eye” is the exact logic the West has been trying to leave behind.
The greatest risk of the operation is that, while Ukraine might have managed to force Russia to redeploy its forces, it also has to stretch its already overstretched own forces. In fact, it had to send its best-equipped and trained troops (the 22nd and 88th Mechanised Brigades and the 80th Air Assault Brigade, if the news are correct) into Russia – troops that could have been deployed to defend Ukrainian territory, but were not, because they were “too valuable to waste”.
Moscow will hit back (it cannot afford not to), and it will hit back quite hard, probably causing significant losses to Ukrainian military and infrastructure. It already hit Ukraine with a barrage of missile and drone strikes.
An attack on Kyiv has claimed the lives of two people while injuring many more. As the secrecy surrounding the attack rendered Ukrainian authorities unable to evacuate the border areas, now there is a desperate scramble to evacuate some 20,000 people from the region.
Ukrainian forces might have eyed the rail line and/or the gas terminal near Sudzha, a key point in the pipeline towards Europe (the only pumping station that delivers Russian gas through Ukraine) and a great source of discontent for Kyiv, as the pipeline provides a $2bn income for Gazprom each year. That contract runs until January 2025, and while it angers Ukraine, it helps to keep several European economies afloat.
With not allowing Russian gas through its territory, no matter how contra-intuitive it might seem, Ukraine might lose more supporters than what it gains. Moscow has already proved that it can redirect its supplies to other markets, while Europe is struggling to replace Russian fossil fuels.
And one should not forget, that as Tehran’s and Moscow’s friendship is getting cozier than ever before in the same moment as tensions are running on high in the Middle East, Putin always has the chance to hit back somewhere it hurts not just Kyiv. He doesn’t even need to use his own troops for that.
