There are many tourist attractions in Latvia that belong to either the categories of ’must see’ or ’no go zone’, depending on how much the foreign visitor is ready to experience something unexpected from a Western perspective. Such locations are, for example, a central district of the Latvian capital Riga known as ’Fortress Moscow’ (Maskavas forštate in Latvian, Moskovsky forstadt in Russian) and the shopping centre ’Minsk’ which was opened in 1975 as the very first shopping mall in Riga: both offer exactly what their names suggest. Such places provide the Western visitor with an excellent opportunity to understand the deep ties that have been and still remain between Latvia, and particularly its native Russian population, and Russia. Similar examples can easily be given also with regard to Lithuania, Estonia and Finland as well.
The countries mentioned, including Latvia with its ’Fortress Moscow’, are EU Member States which, due to their geographical location and history, have had more intense relations with both Russia and Belarus, even after they became full members of the EU. Just as Helsinki and Tallinn benefited from Russian shopping tourists for many decades, the shopping centres of Vilnius were full of Belarusians until the EU imposed sanctions in response to Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine in 2022.
Given these circumstances, it is worth paying special attention to the words of Latvian Foreign Minister Baiba Braže, who in an interview with Politico in July voiced a kind of cry for help, claiming that, as for the economic sanctions, the burden of checking cross-border traffic falls mainly on Latvia and Lithuania while other European Union member countries continue to tolerate the rampant evasion of sanctions against Russia and Belarus, making it harder for front-line states to enforce the measures.
To properly understand Braže’s words, it is worth pointing out that the Baltic states have altogether a 1,600-kilometer border with Russia and Belarus, that is why the Baltic border crossings have become a prime destination for those seeking to evade sanctions on goods despite the fact that each of the Baltic states operates only one or two checkpoints with Russia or its ally Belarus which is in customs union with Russia. (Finland has closed all roads into Russia, leaving only a rail link operational.) And goods keep arriving at the Baltic borders come from across Europe… https://www.politico.eu/article/baltic-latvia-estonia-lithuania-border-loophole-eu-russia-ukraine-sanctions
However, the root of the problem the Latvian minister of foreign affairs refers to is not the1,600-kilometer-long border itself but the fact that, while the EU has jointly agreed the 14 sanctions against Putin’s Russia, the Member States are individually responsible for implementing them.
In fact, it is the practice that Member States are interpreting sanctions in 27 different ways that has resulted loopholes and a lack of accountability.
The current situation indicates that the sanctions policy, without a strongly centralized model, does not work. An effective coordination mechanism controlled by the Commission could help, but Brussels has not been able to set up such a system. Or, maybe, it does not really want to do that, considering that the centralization of the interpretation of sanctions across the EU – kind of a United States of Europe -, from the perspective of nations could easily cause sovereignty related problems.
However, it would be a mistake to claim that the European Commission has not done anything. In fact, in February, a single letter was written by top officials in Brussels and sent to capitals in which the European Commission has demanded governments urgently crack down on the illegal flow of goods to Russia. The letter clearly suggested that Brussels would prefer to take control of closing sanctions loopholes. Sanctioned items from the EU are reaching Russia by first traveling through non-EU countries before re-export to Russia – and through subsidiaries of European companies which operate outside the bloc to manufacture the items, the letter said. The letter also urged governments to hold accountable EU operators that have been actively undermining EU sanctions.
The fact that there are loopholes in EU sanctions against Russia at the Baltic border has become an open secret ever since the sanctions have been imposed – it is known by each and all Baltic customs officials and border guards who found themselves in a helpless situation soon after the sanctions were introduced. On the one side, representatives of official bodies can do nothing given that trucks crossing the EU border often carry legitimate cargo destined for another country in Central Asia… Truck drivers found out soon that if officials do not let them through at one check point, they can go to another one and try to enter Russia there. On the other side, according to Baltic customs officials, politicians do not want to spend money on the implementation of the sanctions. The only thing that matter for them is the decision about imposing sanctions at EU level but no one cares about the implementation, they say. Shortly, there is no funds for border management and substantial customs control. As a consequence, sanctioned goods that are supposed to transit Russia are simply unloaded once they cross the border – where they disappear while others reach their destination, only to be re-exported back into Russia.
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are among the most hawkish EU countries on sanctions over the war in Ukraine. This approach roots, first of all, in their history, in addition, they are committed to clean up their reputation as Baltic states used to serve as crucial links in money laundering schemes operated by Russia.
The fact that the Baltics are caught in the middle between the EU and Russia was perfectly illustrated by words of Russian senior security official Nikolai Patrushev in June 2022 as he warned Lithuania of serious consequences after it banned the rail transfer of some goods to the Russian territory of Kaliningrad, in line with EU sanctions. Russia considered it an openly hostile action – committed by Lithuania. (The Kaliningrad Region of the Russian Federation has no border with mainland Russia and is bordered by Lithuania and Poland. It relies heavily on imports of raw materials and spare parts from Russia and the EU.)
Despite such incidents, the Baltic states, including Lithuania continue their struggle with their Eastern neighbours: in April 2024, the Lithuanian government has proposed to extend the national sanctions against Russians and Belarusians for another year. As for Estonia, it is important to note that the Estonian parliament passed an act that enables the use of Russian assets frozen under international sanctions to compensate Ukraine for war damages in May, months before the EU made its own decision. (Interestingly, this is the same Estonia, which former PM Kaja Kallas’s husband, Arvo Hallik has continued to do business with Russia since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 despite the fact that Kallas has been a vocal supporter of Ukraine and, sanctions against Russia. This summer, she was appointed as the EU High Representitive for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.) Although Finland is not a Baltic state, but is shares a border with Russia, so it is worth mentioning a recent example for this country as well. Finland’s Gasum – a key gas supplier to the Nordic region – recently announced that, it stops buying and importing Russian LNG in line with new European Union sanctions.
The above cases suggest not only that EU Member States have to put European sanctions into practice by rating their own national interests second and that they are left to guard the actual implementation of sanctions without any help, but also that sanctions are considered important by Brussels only as long as the decision to impose them is taken and announced.
The question arises: if a sanctions package only matters as long as a press conference declaring EU unity is held, does anyone really care whether the sanctions are applied and, closely related to that, whether these sanctions actually work?
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